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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA M. ROBISON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
-vs.-
PETE WILLDEN, .a minor by and 
through his guardian Ad Litem, MAR-
VELL WILLDEN, and MARVELT_j 
WILLDEN, 
Defendants and Appellants 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ca.se No. 
8597 
The plaintiff, age· 73, brought this action to recover 
damages for her personal injuries reeeived as a result 
of an automobile accident. The accident occurred on 
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October 18, 1.955, at dusk (Tr. 44), at approximately 
6:00 o'clock P.M. (Tr. 5; 43), when the car in which 
she was riding, driven by her husband, age 83, while 
making a left turn, w,as struck by the defendant's oppo-
site bound car. 
The accident occurred on Fifth East Street, a four-
lane thoroughfare running north and south in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and near the intersection of Hawthorne 
Avenue, which intersects on the east side of Fifth E'ast 
Street only. (Tr. 43; Exhibit P-3; Tr. 46) 
Fifth E.ast Street provides four lanes of traffic, 
the opposite bound traffic lanes being separated by 
painted double yellow lines in the center of the highway. 
There are additional parking lanes provided against 
each curb (Tr. 44). The entranceway to Hawthorne 
Avenue, where the plaintiff and her husband reside, is 
13 feet four inches wide, the approximate width of many 
priv~ate driveways (Tr. 16). 
The plaintiff and her hu.sband, at the tune of the 
accident, were en route to their home on Hawthorne 
Avenue fron1 downtown Salt Lake City. l\Ir. Robison 
was driving south on Fifth East Street. Although an 
eye witness, Frank Bo\vn1an, "~ho \Vas driving south on 
Fifth East Street in the inside lane of travel, testified 
that Mr. Robison had 1nade the. left tuTn from tl1e out-
side l~ane of tr.avel aeross the path of the 'vitness and 
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a car ahead of the witness (Tr. 78; 82), we will \COn-
sider the facts £avorable to the plaintiff, as we must 
for the purposes of this statement. He was driving 
south in the inside lane of travel, the lane nearest the 
center double lines separating oppo~site bound vehicles. 
Southbound traffic was fairly heavy (Tr. 40; 78; 82), 
but Mr. Robison testified there were no northbound 
vehicles in the one-half block south of Hawthorne 
Avenue, excepting the defendant's vehicle (Tr. 12; ), 
which was 300 feet south of the Robison vehicle when 
the plaintiff's car started its left turn (Tr. 17; 21; 26). 
Before starting his left turn, and as he approached 
the area where he intended to turn left, Mr. Robison 
testified (Tr. 6) : 
"I think I stopped. If I didn't stop suddenly, 
I slowed up mighty slow before I did make the 
turn.'' 
Mr. Robison did not give a hand signal to indicate 
his intention to turn, but testified that his left turn 
light signals were on (Tr. 6). It wa.s getting dusk at 
the time, but not dark enough to require headlights and 
the headlights on the plaintiff's vehicle were not on 
(Tr. 22). After starting hi'S left turn, the plaintiff's 
vehicle was struck by the defendant's opposite bound 
car, the point of impact, with relation to the cars being 
undisputed, that is, the right front of the defendant's 
car with the right front door, .a.nd thereafter the right 
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side and rear of the plaintiff's car (Tr. 17; 47; et al). 
The impact shoved the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle 
around to the east, where the rear of the Robison car 
struck a car parked north of Hawthorne Avenue (Tr. 47). 
During the accident, the right front door of the Robison 
car sprung open, and the plaintiff fell to the street 
beside the car where it had come to rest following the 
accident. 
Officer Cahoon, the inve.stigating officer at the 
scene, testified ( Tr. 51) that he established the point 
of impact .as six feet into the inside lane for northbound 
traffic. Eye witness Bowman (Tr. 80; 81) also placed 
the point of impact in the inside lane, verifying the 
defendant's testimony. However, the plaintiff's husband 
testified (Tr. 18) : 
"I was probably in the outside lane (at the 
time of impact) but just about the right distance 
for him to hit my right front door." 
(Tr. 17) 
"A. He hit the front door first, and he was in 
the outsid·e l:ane next to the parking lane. 
Q. That would be in this lane which I am marking 
X' 
A. I suppose that is the lane he would have been 
in. He wouldn't have been over in the lane 
next to the curb." 
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The plaintiff's husband, registered owne:r of the 
vehicle he was driving, assigned his cause of action 
for damages to the car to his wife, the plaintiff. 
The trial was held without a jury, and .at the con-
clusion of the evidence the Court found the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and 
awarded her damages for her injuries, but denied re-
covery for the damages to the: Robison vehicle, the 
Court's finding~s being: 
"that the negligence of the defendant, Pete 
Willden, consisted of failure to maintain a proper 
and reasonable lookout, and failure to yie~ld the 
right-of-way to the vehicle in which plaintiff was 
riding as a passenger.'' (Findings of fact, Para-
graph 2). 
The Court also found in its Findings of Fact: 
"5. That George F. Robison, as the owner 
of the car he was driving, also negligently con-
tributed to the collision in which the plaintiff was 
injured." 
STATEM·Et~T OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE LOWER COUR.T 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
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"Findings not supported by any competent 
evidence or which disregard uncontroverted credi-
ble evidence ... cannot be sustained and a judg-
ment based thereon will be reversed.'' 
3 Am. Jur., Appeal & Error, Sec. 899, pg. 464. 
We submit that the evidence was clear and uncon-
tradicted by competent testimony that the plaintiff's 
vehicle traveled only six feet into the inside northbound 
lane of travel when struck by defendant's opposite bound 
vehicle, and that the testimony of the plaintiff and her 
aged husband to the contrary was incredible and such 
that reasonable minds could not differ in refusing to 
give any credence to it. 
The testimony and evidence supporting the defend-
ant's testimony that the impact occurred in the inside 
lane for northbound traffic, which lane the defendant 
was traveling when the accident occurred, can be sum-
marized as follows : 
Officer c·ahoon, called by the plaintiff, testified: 
(Tr. 50) 
"A. The first ·point of impact was eleven feet three 
inches north of the north curb of Hawthorne 
Avenue, and it "~as twenty-t"·o feet three 
inches west of the east curb of Fifth East. 
Q. And which lane of northbound traffic is that 
point in 1 
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A. That is the inside driving lane. 
Q. And that is the lane next to the center line~ 
A. That is correct." 
(Tr. 51) 
"Q. . . Now, then ... how far into the inside lane 
had the Robison vehicle traveled when this 
accident occurred~ 
A. . . Six feet approximately, plus or minus a 
few inches. Now, that is where the point of 
impact took place." 
Further, we refer to Exhibit P-3, which this witness 
prepared ( Tr. 46). 
Frank Bowman, .an eye witness to the accident, after 
testifying that he wa_s driving south in the inside lane 
of Fifth East, testified: 
(Tr. 78) 
"There was one car ahead of me, and the 
Robison car was to the - in the lane to the right 
of me. He cut in ahead of the car which was 
ahead of me, crossed the double line to· go into 
Hawthorne Avenue. The car ahead of me was 
obliged to slow down to quit from hitting him, 
and I also was obliged to slow down. As. soon as 
he cros.sed the center line, why, the northbound 
automobile hit him." 
(Tr. 80) 
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"Q. Now, how much time elapsed from the time 
that the Robison car crossed the center double 
lines that elapsed before the accident oc-
curred? 
A. I can't tell you that. The Robison car cut 
across the line, and the - it was just across 
the line, and it was hit. 
Q. It was hit immediately? 
A. Hit immediately, yes, indeed." 
(Tr. 81) 
"Q. You say the impact occurred on the lane next 
to the center line, in the northbound lane next 
to the center line 1 
A. Next to the center line, ye.s." 
(Tr. 84) 
"Q. You wouldn't be able to state in the matter of 
seconds as to the time which elapsed between 
the time when he (Robison) cut across in front 
and when the oollision actu-ally occurred, would 
you? 
A. Well, the amount of time was practically negli-
gible. It happened instantaneously. The car 
crossed the line. Mr. Robison's ear was hit 
immediately." 
William A. Robison, plaintiff's 'vitness, testified 
that he was driving south on Fifth East and had observed 
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the plaintiff's car following him as they proceeded to-
wards Hawthorne Avenue (Tr. 36). 
(Tr. 40) 
"Q. Now what lane of travel was Mr. Willden's 
car in~ 
A. Well, that I couldn't say. 
Q. Could it have been in the inside lane~ 
A. Yes, it could have been. 
Q. Well, how much time elapsed, if you recall, 
between the time Mr. Robison started his turn 
and the time of the accident~ 
A. Well, it wasn't very long. 
Q. It wa_s in f~act very short, wasn't it~ 
A. That's right." 
The above witnesses, we submit, fully substantiate 
the defendant's testimony that he was proceeding north 
in the inside lane of traffic, and that the Robison vehicle 
suddenly made a left turn directly into his path and 
that the impact immediately resulted in the inside lane 
for northbound traffic, so suddenly, in fact, that the 
defendant had time only to react and apply his brakes 
at the moment of impact. 
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The only evidence produced by plaintiff to refute 
the above, and to establish the point of impact in the 
northbound outside lane of travel, was her own testi-
mony, and that of her husband. Mr. Robison testified 
as follows: 
(Tr. 5) 
"Q. Now, as you proceeded south on Fifth East 
toward the intersection of Hawthorne Avenue 
and Fifth East, will you state what you did? 
A. I looked south and saw a car coming about 
three hundred feet away right in front of the 
Oakwood Apartments, and I saw that I had-
ordinarily I had plenty of time to make the 
turn because I have driven in and out there 
for thirty-six years, and so I made the turn, 
but he was coming at such a rate of speed that 
he caught me before I got in the Avenue. 
Q. Now, you s-ay that he appeared to be in front 
of the Oakwood Apartments when you saw him 
and as you were making your turn'" 
(Tr. 6) 
"A. Yes,. if anything, farther south ...... " 
(Tr. 12) 
"Q. . .. As you were about to make your turn to 
the left into Hawthorne Avenue, and you saw 
the defendant's car approaching from the 
south, was there any other car between yon 
and hiln coming from the .south~ 
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A. No, definitely, there wasn't a car in front of 
him. 
Q. So that the view between him and you was 
entirely open~ 
A. Yes. If there had been a car, that car would 
have hit me instead of him." 
(Tr. 14) 
"Q. Now, which lane of traffic was Mr. Willden's 
car in~ 
A. He was in the lane nearest the curb. 
Q. So that the impact was in the outside lane of 
traffic or the lane next to the parking lane~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, as you were turning, did you observe 
Mr. Willden's car approaching~ 
A. I saw it a way down there a long, long ways 
away. 
Q. And did you then .see it between that point and 
the time that the accident occurred~ 
A. Well, I saw him coining way down there, but 
I didn't know that he was coming at a terrific 
rate of speed, . . . .and when he was within 
probably seventy-five or a hundred feet from 
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the impact, I began to think maybe I would 
get out of the way, and I didn't" 
(Tr. 17) 
"Q. Now, then, when you started your left turn, 
that w.as when he was at three hundred feet 
away~ 
A. Yes .... 
A. He hit the front door first, and he was in the 
outside lane next to the parking lane. 
Q. Th:at would be in this lane which I am marking 
'X'~ 
A. I suppose that is the lane he would have been 
in. He wouldn't have been over in the lane next 
to the curb." 
(Tr. 18) 
"A. I was probably in the outside lane, but just 
about the right distance for him to hit my 
front door." 
(Tr. 21) 
"Q. But in either event, when you started your 
turn, Mr. Willden was three hundred feet 
away? 
A. Yes." 
(Tr. 26) 
"Q. Mr. Robison, counsel asked you about your 
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deposition in which you stated that the time 
you were about to make your turn, you saw the 
defendant coming. He was in front of the 
O.akwood Apartments, which you thought was 
about two hundred fifty feet away. Since that 
time have you actually measured the distance 
between the intersection of Hawthorne Avenue 
and the Oakwood Apartments~ 
A. Since that time I have measured it, .and I know 
that it's - right to the street it's at least 
three hundred feet." 
The plaintiff testified that she had not seen the 
defendant's car before the accident, and her testimony 
was so vague and uncertain concerning the facts of the 
accident, that we fail to see how any credence could 
properly be given to it. For example: 
(Tr. 115) 
"Q. What did your husband do before he turned 
into Hawthorne Avenue~ 
A. Well, you always have to slow down a little. 
Q. Do you recall whether he slowed down this 
time or not~ 
A. I guess he did. You have to when you turn in 
there, not very much, but -
Q. Do you recall wh.at lane he was traveling in 
before he slowed down to make the turn~ 
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A. Ye.s. He was traveling in the lane that he 
should be to make the turn. 
Q. Was that the lane next to the center line~ 
A. I guess it was." 
But even if we assume that the plaintiff's testimony 
was corroborative of her husband's, it is our contention 
that she has merely corroborated an incredible version, 
not subject to ·belief by reasonable minds. 
Bearing in mind that the Lower Court found no 
excessive speed on the part of the defendant, the Court, 
nevertheless, must have given credence to the destimony 
of the plaintiff and her husband. If such be the case, 
the Honorable Court believed that while the defendant's 
vehicle was traveling 300 feet, at a legal speed, the 
plaintiff's vehicle was, during the same time traveling 
at most (assuming the Court found the impact occurred 
in the outside lane), a distance of approximately 15 feet. 
"Findings not supported by any competent 
evidence or which disregard uncontroverted credi-
ble evidence or which are contrary to a conclusion 
of law resulting from other facts found, cannot be 
sustained, and a judgment based thereon will be 
reversed. The question 'vhether or not the facts 
found support the conclusions of la'v is one of 
la,v." 3 Am. Jur. sec. 900, pg. 464. 
The po.sted speed lin1it at the scene is 30 ~IPH, or 
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44 feet per second. To travel 300 feet would, therefore, 
consume almost 7 seconds. The defendant's car, 'at an 
average speed of 5 MPH would require 2.1 seconds, and 
the above is conside;ring the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, in light with the Findings of 
the Lower Court. 
We submit, therefore, that as a matter of law, the 
plaintiff's te.stimony is inherently unbelievable and that 
reasonable minds would not differ. 
If that be correct, then the evidence required a find-
ing that the impact occurred only six feet into the inside 
lane of travel. It needs no argument that even if the 
plaintiff's vehicle were stopped before it started, it 
traveled only 6 feet before impact. The defendant, ad-
mittedly traveling at a legal speed, that is not over 
30 MPH, could not possibly have been over one second 
away, which obviolfsly would not have given defendant, 
as a matter of law, a clear opportunity to ob.serve the 
danger, react to it, and bring his car to a stop to avoid 
the accident. 
We submit, therefore, that the Court's findings of 
negligence upon the defendant were not supported by 
competent evidence, and that defendant is entitled to a 
reversal of the judgment, with instructions to enter judg-
ment in favor of the defendant, No Cause of Action. 
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'~S NEGLIGENCE, AS FOUND BY 
THE LOWER COURT, WAS FOUND IN ERRO·R AND WAS 
NOT A PRO·XIMATE CAU·SE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S IN-
JURIE;S. 
The Court found the defendant negligent in two 
particulars : 
1. Failure to yield the right of way, which we sub-
mit was error. 
2. F.ailing to keep a proper lookout, which we sub-
mit wa.s not a proximate cause of the accident. 
The Court also found !fr. Robison, plaintiff's hus-
band, negligent and his negligence a proximate cause of 
the accident. 
The Court's Findings that the RQbison vehicle had 
the right-of-way over defendant's vehicle, was not sup-
ported by any evidence, and \Yas contradictory and consti-
tutes error as a matter of la\v. 
The Court either found that the left turning Rob~on 
vehicle travelled only 6 feet into the opposite bound 
inside traffic lane \vhen struck, "~hich finding \Yas sup-
ported by the over\vhehning "~eight of the evidence~ or 
the Court 1nay have found that the in1pact occurred in 
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the opposite bound outside lane, according to the unsup-
ported testimony of the plaintiff and her aged husband. 
In the first place, we respectfully submit that the 
plaintiff's vehicle was not entitled to the right-of-way, 
regardles.s of the Court's Findings above, inasmuch as 
the Robison vehicle was not within an intersection when 
Mr. Robison made his left turn, as required by the Right 
of Way Statute, Article 9, 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which reads : 
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection 
intending to turn left shall yield the right of way 
to any vehicle approaching from the opposite di-
rection which is within the intersection or so close 
thereto as to con.stitute an immediate hazard ... '' 
Further, we refer the Court to Article 8, 41-6-66, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, with relation to the require-
ments of a proper left turn at an intersection. 
"The driver of a vehicle intending to turn 
at an intersection shall do so as follows: 
(b) At any intersection where traffic is per-
mitted to move in both directions on each road-
way entering the intersection, an approach for a 
left turn shall be made in that portion of the 
right half of the roadway nearest the center line 
thereof and by passing to the right of such center 
line where it enters the intersection and after 
entering the intersection the left turn shall be 
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made so as to leave the intersection to the right 
of the center line of the roadway being entered. 
Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made 
in that portion of the intersection to the left of 
the center of the intersection." 
The uncontradicted evidence, produced by plaintiff, 
in the investigating officer's testimony, and in the exhibit 
P-3 offered by plaintiff, shows that the point of impact 
occurred 11 feet 3 inches north of the north curb of Haw-
thorne Avenue, indicating clearly that Mr. Robison was 
"cutting the corner," and must obviously have started 
his left turn when his vehicle was ap·proxirnately a car 
length away from the intersection, in direct violation of 
the above statutory regulations. 
It needs no extensive argument for the proposition 
that a motorist may not seize the right-of-\Yay by violat-
ing the express provision of the law. 
"In order for a driver to claim the right of 
way on the basis of\ entering the intersection first, 
it must appear that he did not speed up just for 
the purpose of clain1ing the right of \Yay, and 
also that the 1nargin or distance by ,,~hich he 
claimed it 'va.s so clear as to be \Yithout doubt." 
2 Blashfield Cyrl. Auto L.a\\'" & Practice, sec. 991, 
quoted with approval in l\Iartin Ys. Stevens, --------
Utah ________ , 243 P. 2nd @ 750. 
While the facts in that case are not parallel to the 
case at Bar, the state1nent of the la\v \Yith relation to 
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right of way must of necessity apply to left turning 
vehicles when there are opposite bound vehicles ap-
proaching. 
See also, Cedarloff vs. Whited, infra pg. --------· 
But aside from the above, it is readily apparent from 
the facts, considered in their favorable light to the plain-
tiff, that as a matter of law Mr. Robison started his left 
turn when the defendant's vehicle wa~ so close as to 
constitute a hazard. For this purpose, therefore, we 
will assume that the impact occurred in the northbound 
outside lane, which, again, is contradictory to plaintiff's 
own witness, Officer 'C'ahoon. 
We submit the following analysis as a combined 
argument that the Robison vehicle, for another reason, 
did not have the right-of-way as a matter of la,v, and 
that the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep 
a proper lookout could not have been a proximate cause 
·of the resulting accident. 
Bearing in mind that the Honorable Trial Court 
found no negligence on the part of defendant with re-
lation to sveed, and assuming our Point One is in error, 
and the Lower Court would have properly found that the 
impact occurred in the outside lane of travel, the follow-
ing propositions, for the sake of this argument, can be 
accepted: 
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1. That the speed of defendant's car, considered 
most favorably to plaintiff, was 30 mph, the 
posted speed limit at the scene. 
2. That the impact occurred in the outside lane 
for northbound traffic. 
3. That the defendant stopped before starting his 
left turn and that he was traveling, according 
to his own testimony, .at 10 mph at the impact, 
or an average speed of 5 mph. 
4. That defendant's car left no brake marks. 
Based on the above, the defendant's vehicle was 
traveling at 44 feet per second; the plaintiff's at 7 feet 
per second. 
Based on the above propositions, it can be BJ;sumed 
with reasonable accuracy, that the plaintiff's vehicle 
traveled 16 feet after crossing the center double lines 
(based on the width of the inside lane, 10 feet plus 6 f~et 
into the outside lane) ; that the time consumed (at 7 feet 
per second) was 2.3 seconds ; that during that time de-
fendant's vehicle would have traveled 101.2 feet ( +± feet 
per second x 2.3 seconds). 
The defendant's vehicle, traveling 30 mph, would 
have required 79 feet to eo1ne to a con1plete stop, includ-
ing the norn1al reaction tilne of 33 feet, plus the full 
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braking distance of 46 feet. (See Utah Highway Patrol 
booklet.) 
It is clear, therefore, that the defendant had 22.2 
feet, or one-half second, during which presumably, from 
the Lower Court's Findings, he was not keeping a proper 
lookout, as quite obviously had defendant seen the plain-
tiff's left turning vehicle when he was 79 feet away, 
and he re.acted immediately and came to a "screaming" 
stop, his front bumper would have touched the side of 
the plaintiff's vehicle. 
But the above yard stick and mathematical evalu-
ation of the defendant's conduct is both unrealistic and 
ridiculous. It completely ignores the human .equation of 
the perception time that elapses, the realization time that 
is always present when a motorist is confronted with a 
sudden and unexpected emergency, and it is common 
knowledge that tho.se times can and do consume as _high 
as two seconds. 
It further ignores the fact, which this Court has 
stated on other occasions, that the defendant, had he been 
"staring" at the Robison vehicle before that vehicle 
started its left turn, would have been justified in believ-
ing that Mr. Robison would obey the law. 
"Where one operating his vehicle on the 
proper side of the street makes a survey of the 
condition of the street ahead and observes no one 
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coming on his side of the street but sees one 
coming toward him on the opposite side of the 
street, he may as.sume that such person will con-
tinue on the opposite side." Richards vs. Palace 
Laundry, 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. 439. 
To hold defendant negligent for not "reacting" at 
the commencement of those 22 feet 2 inches is to place 
upon him the onus of detecting, realizing danger, and 
reacting, the very split second that the plaintiff's vehicle 
illegally started into the inside laneJ and allowing de-
fendant no time whatsoever to determine that Robison 
was not meTely crawling part way into his turn and 
that ·he would in fact stop clear of the defendant's 
approach and allow him to clear before continuing to 
complete his left turn. This Court has already previously 
stated that the defendant is under no such unrealistic rule 
of conduct. 
We contend that the facts of the case at Bar are 
the same, in legal effect, as the facts in Cederloff vs. 
Whited} 169 Pac. 2nd 778, although in that case the de-
fendant was the left turning Yehicle. 
"If the jury found that the defendant made the 
turn very slowly, in accordance with his testi-
mony, then his negligence 'vas the sole pro:xllnate 
cause of the collision. Had the driver of plaintiff's 
car observed defendant slo"~ly n1aking the turn, 
in accordance 'vith defendant's te.stimony, he 
would be justified in assun1ing that defendant 
had seen his approach and 'vould stop, as the law 
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required him to before entering the northbound 
traffic lane, and allow plaintiff's car to pass. To 
drive in that manner would be an invitation to 
the driver of plaintiff's car to continue in his 
regular course, and when defendant continued to 
crawl into plaintiff's lane of traffic and failed 
to stop, as the law required him to do, it would 
be too late to avoid the accident by the time that 
plaintiff's driver could discover that defendant 
was not going to stop. Thus, as a matter of law, 
defendant's negligence would be the sole proxi-
mate cause of the accident. Even though the 
plaintiff's driver failed to keep a proper lookout, 
and for that reason did not see defendant slowly 
making the turn, such failure would not be a proxi-
mate contributing cause of the collision because 
he could not, under those circumstances, be reason 
ably expected to have done any different than he 
did had he kept a proper lookout." 
"It would take time after defendant com-
menced to turn before plaintiff's driver, if keep-
ing a proper lookout, would be able to realize that 
defendant was turning and was not merely weav-
ing slightly from side to side, and after that, if 
defendant was traveling fast enough to indicate 
that he did not intend to stop, his car would. have 
to travel such a short distance before he would 
be directly in front of plaintiff's car in the course 
of his travel so that plaintiff's car would not have 
time to stop and thereby avoid a collision . . . 
So under these circumstance.s, plaintiff could not 
have avoided the accident, and defendant's negli-
gence was, as a matter of law, the sole· proximate 
cause of the collision and resulting injury, and 
the Court erred in not so instructing the jury." 
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It is customary, and not at all unusual, for a vehicle 
at an intersection, intending to turn left, to crawl forward 
in its left turn into the inside lane for opposite bound 
traffic, when there are no vehicles approaching therein, 
and to stop before encroaching into the outside lane 
until an approaching vehicle in the lane has cleared. 
Such a maneuver is salutary and to be encouraged, inas-
much as it permits cars behind the left turning vehicle to 
proceed forward and assists in the flow of traffic. 
An analogous custom has been noted by this Court, 
with approval, in Hickock vs. Skinner, 190 Pac. 2nd 514, 
at 517: 
"It is not unusual for drivers crossing a wide 
arterial highway such as this to proceed across 
the near half of the street and then stop or 
come to a near stop near the middle to permit 
the passage of through traffic on the other half." 
It is quite apparent, therefore, that if the defendant 
were allowed only one second to observe the Robison 
vehicle start up, and assuming that he thereafter immedi-
ately reacted to the emergency, the defendant's car would 
then be only 57.2 feet from the point of n11pact, 33 feet of 
which would then be ronsu1ned in getting his brakes 
applied, and the ren1aining 24.2 feet only remaining 
1n which to stop. 
From the foregoing, "Te subn1it that the plaintiff's 
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vehicle most certainly did not have the right-of-way. To 
uphold the Lower Court's Findings in this respeet would 
be a sanction by this Court for left turning vehicles 
to create emergencies and place the burden upon opposite 
bound vehicles to get out of the emergency as best they 
could. 
This c·ourt, obviously, has not condoned that pr.ac-
tice, and we refer to French vs. Utah Oil Refining Co., 
216 Pac. 2nd 1002 @ pg. 1004: 
"When a statute prescribes that a turning 
vehicle must yield the right-of-way to another on a 
straight of way when the latter is close enough 
to constitute a hazard, it anticip.ates the exercise 
of reasonable judgment on the part of the driver 
turning. However, a burden is placed on the 
driver making the turn as he has control of the 
situation, and if there is a reasonable probability 
that the movement cannot be made in safety, then 
the disfavored driver should yield. The driver 
proceeding straight ahead has little opportunity 
to know a vehicle is to be turned across his path 
until the movement is commenced and in many 
instances, the warning is too late for the latter 
driver to take effective action." 
We earnestly submit, therefore, that the Honorable 
District Court erred in its Findings that the Robison 
vehicle had the right of way, and further erred in finding 
that the defendant's negligence in failing to keep a 
proper lookout was a proximate cause of the accident 
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and the resulting injuries to plaintiff. We submit there-
fore, that the defendant is entitled to .a reversal of the 
judgment, with instructions to enter judgment for the 
defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS E. MIDGLEY 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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